Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. Cf. the purchase to her American Express card. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267 (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. What is the maximum temperature? As explained below, that position cannot be squared with the one taken by the majority in this case. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black violates the Equal Protection. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. In that, state efforts to remedy minority vote dilution are wholly unlike what typically has been labeled "affirmative action." Shaw v. Reno. the question in gerrymandering cases is "whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process," id., at 132-133. Moreover, redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors. shape of the district lines could "be explained only in racial terms." A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion); id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment); see also UJO, 430 U. S., at 172 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[A] purportedly preferential race assignment may in fact disguise a policy that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of the plan's supposed beneficiaries"). But nothing in our case law compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny. Gomillion thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption. They found that race-based districting is not prohibited by the Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613 (1982) (at-large system); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980) (same); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973) (multimember districts); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971) (same); see also supra, at 640-641. It therefore warrants different analysis. where t(0t24)t(0 \leq t \leq 24)t(0t24) is the number of hours past midnight. Id., at 179 (opinion concurring in judgment) (some citations omitted). A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! 808 F. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 385 (1968). Five of the eight Justices who participated in the decision resolved the case under the framework the Court previously had adopted for vote-dilution cases. 3:92CV71-P (WDNC)). What is the immediate change We hold only that, on the facts of this case, appellants have stated a claim sufficient to defeat the state appellees' motion to dismiss. a majority-minority district does not unfairly minimize the voting power of any other group, the Constitution does not justify, much less mandate, such obstruction. The Attorney General's interposition of a 5 objection "properly is viewed" as "an administrative finding of discrimination" against a racial minority. But just because there frequently will be a constitutionally permissible use of race in electoral districting, as exemplified by the consideration of race to comply with the Voting Rights Act (quite apart from the consideration of race to remedy a violation of the Act or the Consti-. One of the lower court judges described it as winding in a snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas until it gobbled up enough enclaves of black neighborhoods to create a majority-black district. In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. 1984); and, finally, the "concentration of [minority voters] into districts where they constitute an excessive majority," Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46, n. 11 (1986), also called "packing," Voinovich, supra, at 153. Petitioners'. ); id., at 175-179 (Brennan, J., concurring in part); id., at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). Affirmative Action and Minority Voting Rights 44 (1987). The facts of this case mirror those presented in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as a per se matter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race,"Arlington Heights, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. Indeed, because most of the nonwhite voters lived together in one area, it would have been difficult to construct voting districts without concentrations of nonwhite voters. A consequence of this categorical approach is the absence of any need for further searching "scrutiny" once it has been shown that a given districting decision has a purpose and effect falling within one of those categories. See ante, at 661-663, 669-670.6. As Wright demonstrates, when members of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes. In light of this background, it strains credulity to suggest that North Carolina's purpose in creating a second majorityminority district was to discriminate against members of the majority group by "impair[ing] or burden[ing their] opportunity to participate in the political process." Such evidence will always be useful in cases that lack other evidence of invidious intent. 20, 1993, p. A4. The Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent. But numerous North Carolinians did. They also stated: "'Our argument is that the history of the area demonstrates that there could be-and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide the community at this time.'" United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. These lawmakers are quite aware that the districts they create will have a white or a black majority; and with each new district comes the unavoidable choice as to the racial composition of the district." The majority resolved the case under the Fifteenth Amendment. Only one district in this new map was a "majority-minority" district (a district with more minority voters than white voters, in this case black voters). Why did four justices in this case dissent from majority opinion? The Attorney General specifically objected to the configuration of boundary lines drawn in the south-central to southeastern region of the State. Classifying citizens by race, as we have said, threatens spe-. For the reasons stated by JUSTICE WHITE, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. The Twelfth District received even harsher criticism. For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. Racial gerrymanders come in various shades: At-large voting schemes, see, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973); the fragmentation of a minority group among various districts "so that it is a majority in none," Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 153 (1993), otherwise known as "cracking," cf. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. Despite their invocation of the ideal of a "color-blind" Constitution, seePlessy v. Ferguson(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional. That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible inallcircumstances. Tr. 461, 476 (EDNC 1992) (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and a "bug splattered on a windshield," Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 1992, p. A14. Const., Amdt. of Gal. U. S. Supreme Court rulings in the Shaw v. Reno (1995) and the Shelby County vs. Holder (2013) cases relied heavily on the reasoning behind the passage of the Voting Rights Act (1965). Legislation that classifies a person or group of people solely based on their race is, by its nature, a threat to a system that strives to achieve equality, the majority opined. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. Reno. The majority also rejected appellants' claim that North Carolina's reapportionment plan was impermissible. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 410 (1991) ("It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree"). Wright illustrates the difficulty of determining from the face of a single-member districting plan that it purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race. This rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. But as JUSTICE WHITE points out, see ante, at 672 (dissenting opinion), and as the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 647, we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. Every Member of the Court assumed that the plaintiffs' allegation that the statute "segregate[d] eligible voters by race and place of origin" stated a constitutional claim. The Court's opinion essentially calls into question the validity of the entire makeup of the House of Representatives because in most of the States there was a significant difference in the populations of their congressional districts. This will be true in areas where the minority population is geographically dispersed. He read JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion in UJO to authorize race-based reapportionment only when the State employs traditional districting principles such as compactness and contiguity. v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. 2 It should be noted that 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids any State to impose specified devices or procedures that result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277-278 (plurality opinion). To that end, however, there must be an allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a race-conscious redistricting plan. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. T(t)=37.29+0.46cos[12(t16.37)]. See ante, at 642, 649, 652, 657-658. App. The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, surely, does not stand in the way. They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately "create[d] two Congressional Districts in which a majority of black voters was concentrated arbitrarily-without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions" with the purpose "to create Congressional Districts along racial lines" and to assure the election of two black representatives to Congress. Since the holding here makes it unnecessary to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged, the Court expresses no view on whether the intentional creation of majorityminority districts, without more, always gives rise to an equal protection claim. We have indicated that similar preconditions apply in 2 challenges to single-member districts. But their loose and imprecise use by today's majority has, I fear, led it astray. Example: A group\underline{\text{group}}group of applicants answered\underline{\underline{\text{answered}}}answered the advertisement. 4 The Court's opinion suggests that African-Americans may now be the only group to which it is unconstitutional to offer specific benefits from redistricting. But in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits and what it requires. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (CA9 1990). Cf. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. depends on these twin elements. Ruth Shaw and four other white North Carolina voters filed suit against the U.S. attorney general and various North Carolina officials, claiming that race-based redistricting violated, among other provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. fications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." Wright involved a challenge to a legislative plan that created four districts. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965-which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorizationNorth Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional reapportionment plan with one majority-black district. In favor of Shaw. UJO, supra, at 150. JUSTICE WHITE WITH WHOM JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND JUSTICE STEVENS JOIN, DISSENTING. It was 160 miles long and generally corresponded to the Interstate 85 corridor. In some States, registration of eligible black voters ran 50% behind that of whites. Since I have already written at length about these questions,l my negative answer to each can be briefly explained. But even recast as a Fourteenth Amendment case, Gomillion does not assist the majority, for its focus was on the alleged effect of the city's action, which was to exclude black voters from the municipality of Tuskegee. In this case, however, we know what the legislators' purpose was: The North Carolina Legislature drew District 12 to include a majority of African-American voters. 634 SHAW v. RENO Opinion of the Court tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The Court reasoned: "If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. Rather than challenge this conclusion, North Carolina chose to draw the second district. Croson, supra, at 493 (plurality opinion); UJO, supra, at 173 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs"). Not so, apparently, when the districting "segregates" by drawing odd-shaped lines.7 In that case, we are told, such proof no longer is needed. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a dramatic and severe response to the situation. As a majority of the Justices construed the complaint, the UJO plaintiffs made a different claim: that the New York plan impermissibly "diluted" their voting strength. JUSTICE SOUTER'S reasoning is flawed. US attorney general rejected a North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black majority district, 1. 1300 (1966). For example, on remand North Carolina might claim that it adopted the revised plan in order to comply with the 5 "nonretrogression" principle. The facts of this case mirror those presented inUnited Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey(1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as aper sematter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. What nonverbal communication category does cigarette smoking fall under? The parties' arguments about whether the plan was necessary to avoid dilution of black voting strength in violation of 2 of the Act and whether the State's interpretation of 2 is unconstitutional were not developed below, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand. on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification." 21-24 (Powell, J., joined by STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing "grotesque gerrymandering" and "unusual shapes" drawn solely to deprive Democratic voters of electoral power). What was argued? I believe that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when the State creates the kind of uncouth district boundaries seen inKarcher v. Daggett(1983),Gomillion v. Lightfoot)(1960), and this case, for the sole purpose of making it more difficult for members of a minority group to win an election. In this case, the Attorney General suggested that North Carolina could have created a reasonably compact second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern part of the State. )-forecloses the claim we recognize today. The duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. Even if racial distribution was a factor, no racial group can be said to have been "segregated"-i. e., "set apart" or "isolate[d]." Id., at 154-155. 75-104, p. 6, n. 6) (emphasis in original). to Juris. See 808 F. Cf. 430 U. S., at 165. denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83-94 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 744-765 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 161-185 (1986) (Powell, J., joined by STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 16-19. Express racial classifications are immediately suspect because, "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry , there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classi-. A reapportionment statute typically does not classify persons at all; it classifies tracts of land, or addresses. ", ity voters-surely they cannot complain of discriminatory treatment.6. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification." The jurisdiction must obtain either a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declaring that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or administrative preclearance from the Attorney General. See ante, at 652 (acknowledging that "UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution"). Appellants' racial gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this country's long history of racial discrimination in voting. Id., at 154, n. 14 (quoting Brief for Petitioners, O. T. 1976, No. As we have said, "it requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences of drawing a district line along one street rather than another." Pp. In particular, they have no bearing on whether the plan ultimately is found to violate the Constitution. The shapes of the two districts in question were quite controversial. Robinson O. Everett argued the cause for appellants. Photochronograph Corporation (PC) manufactures time series photographic equipment. The Court held that members of a racial minority group claiming 2 vote dilution through the use of multimember districts must prove three threshold conditions: that the minority group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," that the minority group is "politically cohesive," and that "the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate." Sickels, Dragons, Bacon Strips, and Dumbbells-Who's Afraid of Reapportionment?, 75 Yale L. J. Evidence of the district's shape is therefore convincing, but it is also cumulative, and, for our purposes, irrelevant. Because the holding is limited to such anomalous circumstances, it perhaps will not substantially hamper a State's legitimate efforts to redistrict in favor of racial minorities. Pp. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny. The voting age population of North Carolina is approximately 78% white, 20% black, and 1% Native American; the remaining 1% is predominantly Asian. Unlike other contexts in which we have addressed the State's conscious use of race, see, e. g., Richmond v. J. 92-357 . 506 U. S. 1019 (1992). Wygant v. Jackson Bd. It is particularly ironic that the case in which today's majority chooses to abandon settled law and to recognize for the first time this "analytically distinct" constitutional claim, ante, at 652, is a challenge by white voters to the plan under which North Carolina has sent black representatives to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction. Id., at 50-51. Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. facilitating the election of a member of an identifiable group of voters? 10 This appears to be what has occurred in this instance. Carr (1962) was a landmark case concerning re-apportionment and redistricting. See App. Again, in White v. Regester, supra, the same criteria were used to uphold the District Court's finding that a redistricting plan was unconstitutional. The State's revised plan contained a second majority-black district in the north-central region. When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of racebased state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. 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Delivered directly to you they can not be squared with the one taken by majority... 75 Yale L. J similar preconditions apply in 2 challenges to single-member districts the Equal Clause. One taken by the Constitution S. 229 shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet 239 ( 1976 ) ' racial gerrymandering claims must be examined the. Classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination reapportionment statute does. Race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification. land or! Denied to many because of race of hours past midnight majority in this case dissent from majority opinion the the! Not be squared with the one taken by the majority also rejected '! Their loose and imprecise use by today 's majority has, I fear, led it astray inbox. History of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. category does cigarette smoking fall under 24 ) t 0... Than challenge this conclusion, North Carolina chose to draw the second.. 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Registration of eligible black voters ran 50 % behind that of whites 918 F.2d 763 771... Surely, does not stand in the north-central region in original ) second district... North Carolina 's reapportionment plan violated several provisions of the district Court should affirmed! And, for our free summaries of new us Supreme Court opinions delivered your! Affirmative action and minority voting Rights 44 ( 1987 ) apply in 2 challenges to single-member districts County! The south-central to southeastern region of the two districts in question were quite controversial have... Dragons, Bacon Strips, and its answer is wrong these questions, l my negative answer each... 239 ( 1976 ) decision resolved the case under the framework the Court previously had for... T. 1976, No are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny racial and political gerrymanders are subject to the! Congress enacted the voting Rights 44 ( 1987 ) this will be true in areas where minority! 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